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Investigating the alternative-sensitivity of know ∗
Wataru Uegaki Paul Marty
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract Several semantic analyses of know have been proposed in recent years to
account for the so-called Gettier Problem. These analyses make distinct predictions
regarding the sensitivity of know to the alternative possibilities expressed by its
complement, as induced by expressions such as disjunction. These predictions
were tested in two experiments. Results show that knowledge sentences with a
disjunctive complement (e.g., John knows that Mary has a son or a daughter) are
more likely to be judged as false than classically-equivalent sentences with non-
disjunctive complements (e.g., John knows that Mary has a child) under Gettier-like
scenarios. We discuss how these findings provide evidence for the alternative-
sensitive approach to know.
Keywords: know, Gettier problem, alternative-sensitivity, disjunction, experiment.
1 Introduction
The notion of alternatives plays an important role in a variety of areas in natural
language semantics. In particular, work in Alternative Semantics (e.g., Kratzer &
Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 2006) and Inquisitive Semantics (e.g., Groenendijk
& Roelofsen 2009; AnderBois 2011) has focused on specific expressions, such as
disjunctions, indefinites and wh-expressions, that introduce alternatives in semantic
representations. The interaction between these alternatives and alternative-sensitive
operators enables explanations of a variety of semantic puzzles such as free-choice,
disjunctive antecedents of counterfactuals, and the behavior of wh-indeterminates.
This paper presents yet another case in which alternatives introduced by a
disjunction interact with an alternative-sensitive operator. Following Uegaki (2012),
we analyze the verb know as an alternative-sensitive expression, and derive the
falsity of the sentence x knows that S in the so-called Gettier cases (Gettier 1963) in
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terms of the alternative-sensitivity. This analysis makes distinct predictions from
Kratzer’s (2002) semantic analysis of Gettier cases. Specifically, the alternative-
based analysis predicts that a knowledge sentence with a disjunctive complement can
have a different truth value from one with a non-disjunctive complement, even when
the complements of the two sentences are classically equivalent. This prediction was
tested in a series of experiments using a truth value judgment paradigm. We discuss
how the results favor the alternative-based analysis.
2 The Gettier Problem and two existing semantic analyses
Gettier cases are well-known counterexamples to the traditional view that the pos-
session of a justified true belief constitutes knowledge (Gettier 1963). Consider for
instance the Gettier scenario in (1a). The knowledge attribution in (1b) is intuitively
false, although the proposition ‘Jones owns a Ford or a BMW’ is a true and justified
belief of Smith.
(1) a. Smith justifiably believes that Jones owns a Ford (He saw Jones with
the key of a Ford, driving a Ford etc.). He justifiably deduces from this
belief that Jones owns a Ford or a BMW although he is unopinionated
about whether Jones owns a BMW. However, it turns out that Jones in
fact does not own a Ford although he owns a BMW.
b. # Smith knows that [Jones owns a Ford or a BMW].
Gettier cases present a challenge to the semantics of the verb know because the
simple-minded analysis in (2), which treats know as justifiably believe + factivity
presupposition, inaccurately predicts the sentence in (1b) to be true, as shown in
(2b).
(2) a. [[know]]w = λ p : [p(w) = 1]λx. JBel(x, p,w)
(where JBel(x, p,w) iff x justifiably believes p in w)
b. [[(1b)]]w = 1 iff [Jones owns a Ford or a BMW in w]
& JBel(S,λw′.Jones owns a Ford or a BMW in w′,w)
One could argue that this is not a problem that has to be dealt with in the
semantics of natural language, but rather a problem in epistemology, to which the
semantics can refer. That is, semanticists can refer to a primitive constant in the
metalanguage to define the denotation of the verb know, and the analysis of the
nature of this constant can be left to philosophers. The Gettier problem might be
one of the problems about the nature of this constant, and linguists might not have to
deal with it.
However, if the problem is shown to have an interesting connection to other
linguistic problems, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the problem can be
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approached in terms of the semantic theories that have been proposed to deal with
them. This is the kind of motivation that is behind Kratzer’s (2002) situation-semantic
analysis, in which she uses the notion of EXEMPLIFICATION or MINIMALITY of
situations to account for both Gettier cases and counterfactuals. Uegaki (2012)
proposes an analysis of Gettier cases which makes crucial use of the notion of
ALTERNATIVES, following other authors that have used the same notion to account
for a variety of linguistic phenomena, such as focus-related constructions (Dretske
1972; Rooth 1985), questions (Hamblin 1973; Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009),
and free-choice disjunction (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 2006).
Below, we review Uegaki’s (2012) alternative-based analysis and Kratzer’s (2002)
situation-semantic analysis in order.
2.1 Alternative-based analysis
Uegaki (2012) proposes to account for the Gettier problem by treating know as
sensitive to the alternative propositions of the complement. In this analysis, the
traditional ‘truth’, ‘belief’ and ‘justification’ conditions are stated in terms of an
existential claim of a proposition in the set of alternatives for the complement.
Further, there is an additional condition for this proposition to be the strongest
among the alternatives that the subject justifiably believes.1,2 This is formulated as
follows:3
1 The intuition behind this analysis goes back to one of the earliest responses to the Gettier problem:
the No-False-Premise theory (e.g., Clark 1963). The theory states that knowledge must not be based
on an inference from a false premise. The theory correctly predicts that the true belief in the Gettier
cases is not an instance of knowledge since they are based on a false premise. In the case of (1a),
the false premise corresponds to the belief that Jones owns a Ford. In Uegaki’s (2012) analysis of
the verb know, the notion of premise in the No-False-Premise theory corresponds to the notion of
alternatives. See Lycan 2006 for a recent argument for the No-False-Premise theory as an analysis of
the core Gettier cases, and his replies to the existing counterarguments.
2 In the literature in epistemology, some researchers have discussed a class of putative Gettier cases
that cannot be correctly analyzed this way. One paradigm case of this class is the ‘fake barn’ case
by Goldman (1976). We think that such cases are crucially different from the standard Gettier cases
exemplified in (1) in that they involve skeptical information that is independent of the subject’s belief
state.
As Kratzer (2002) notes, a knowledge sentence in the fake barn case is judged less clearly as
false if the skepticism in the context is weaker (e.g., only a few of the barns are fake). In contrast, the
judgment of the falsity in the standard Gettier cases is not affected by contextual factors which are
external to the subject’s belief state. Thus, we claim that these other Gettier cases should be treated
separately from the standard cases discussed in the previous section. More specifically, we assume
that the skeptical information in the context of these cases raises the standard of belief justification,
along the lines of Epistemic Contextualism (cf. e.g., DeRose 1992).
3 In the formulae hereafter, some variables are used to stand either for an English expression or for its
metalanguage translation depending on the context (i.e., whether it is inside [[ ]] or not) for expository
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(3) [[x knows S]]w,E is defined if [[S]]w,E = 1 and if defined, is 1 iff
∃p ∈ [[S]]Alt
 (i) p(w) = 1 ∧(ii) JBel(x, p,w,E) ∧
(iii) ¬∃p′∈ [[S]]Alt [p′ ⊂ p∧ JBel(x, p,w,E)]

(where JBel(x, p,w,E) iff x justifiably believes p based on evidence E)
The additional condition in (iii) correctly predicts (1b) to be false in the Gettier
scenario in (1a), assuming that the alternative propositions of the complement include
the propositions which correspond to individual disjuncts of the complement as well
as the complement itself, as shown in (4).4
(4) [[Jones owns a Ford or a BMW]]Alt = {F ∨B,F,B}
where F = λw.Jones owns a Ford in w; B = λw.Jones owns a BMW in w
The truth conditions correctly predict that (1b) is false in the Gettier scenario in
(1a). This is so because there is no proposition in the alternatives given in (4) that
satisfies the three conditions in (3): F does not satisfy (i), B does not satisfy (ii), and
F ∨B does not satisfy (iii). The reason why F ∨B does not satisfy (iii) is that the
attitude holder Smith believes F which is stronger than F ∨B.
There is an additional detail in the above account that needs a further explanation.
The truth conditions in (3) are relativized to a particular piece of evidence E based
on which the agent x believes the relevant propositions. (In (3), JBel is defined as
a four-place predicate which includes the ‘evidence’ argument.) This is to make
sure that the third condition in (3) deals with the agent’s beliefs based on which the
relevant knowledge is inferred or justified. For an illustration of why this additional
detail is needed, consider the following example:
(5) a. Smith has heard from Jones’ sister that he owns either a Ford or a BMW,
but she does not remember which. Jones’ sister is a reliable person and
Smith has no reason to doubt her. Another day, Smith saw Jones driving a
Ford, so he concluded that Jones owns a Ford. However, Jones in fact does
not own a Ford although he owns a BMW.
b. Smith knows that Jones owns a Ford or a BMW.
What is different between (5) and (1) is that there is an additional piece of
evidence in (5) which suggests that Jones owns a Ford or a BMW, i.e., the report
purposes. For example, the variable x in the left-hand side of (3) stands for an English expression in
the subject position of know while that in the right-hand side stands for the individual denoted by
such an expression.
4 The inclusion of these propositions in the set of alternatives comes about both in Alternative Semantics
(e.g., Alonso-Ovalle 2006) / Inquisitive Semantics (e.g., Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009) or structure-
based theories of alternatives (e.g., Katzir 2007; Fox & Katzir 2011).
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from his sister. Some native speakers find the knowledge attribution in (5b) to be
true by virtue of this additional piece of evidence (Results from our experimental
investigations will be shown in the next section). The formulation in (3) enables us
to understand the availability of this judgment in the following way. In (5a), there
are two independent pieces of evidence based on which Smith can infer the belief
that Jones owns a Ford or a BMW, which can be described as follows:
(6) E1: Jones’ sister told Smith that Jones owns either a Ford or a BMW.
E2: Jones was driving a Ford.
If we evaluate (5b) relative to just E1, then we predict it to be true since Smith
does not believe F based on just E1, and so the proposition F ∨B (which he believes
based on just E1) would satisfy the third condition in addition to the first two
conditions. On the other hand, if we evaluate (5b) relative to E1+E2 i.e., the full set
of evidence available in the context, then we predict falsity since the alternative F is
believed by Smith based on E1+E2, and thus F ∨B fails the third condition.
2.2 Situation-semantic analysis
The second type of approach to the Gettier problem does not treat know as alternative-
sensitive. An example is Kratzer’s (2002) situation-semantic analysis:
(7) a. [[x knows that p]](s∗) = 1 iff there is a situation s that exemplifies p such
that (i) s≤ s∗, (ii) x believes p in s∗ de re of s, and (iii) all relevant possible
worlds in which the subject has the same subjective experience as they do
in s∗ have counterparts of s where p is true.
b. A situation s EXEMPLIFIES a proposition p iff p(s) = 1 and (i) for all
s′ < s, p(s′) = 0 (i.e., s is a minimal situation making p true) or (ii) for all
s′ < s, p(s′) = 1.
According to this analysis, x knows that p is true iff x is in a particular relationship
to a ‘minimal’ fact s which makes p true so that x believes p de re of s. In the Gettier
case in (1), the minimal fact making the complement true is the minimal situation
involving Jones, the BMW, and the owning relationship holding between them. Let’s
call this minimal situation sB. A necessary condition for an individual x’s believing p
de re of s is that for any doxastic alternative world w of x, a counterpart of s is true in
w. Given this assumption, we see that Smith in (1) does not believe the complement
de re of sB since a counterpart of sB is not true for some of his doxastic alternatives
in the Gettier scenario. Thus, this situation-semantic analysis correctly accounts for
the truth-value judgment of the Gettier case in (1).
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2.3 The predictions of the two analyses
Both of the two semantic approaches to the Gettier problem summarized in the
previous sections make the correct prediction for the Gettier case we started with.
However, when applied to new cases, these approaches make distinct predictions
based on their assumptions about the alternative propositions. In this section, we
discuss these distinct predictions in an abstract setting. Then, in the next sections,
we discuss the results of two experiments that tested these predictions using concrete
examples.
As we discussed earlier, the crucial difference between the two approaches lies
in whether the truth conditions of sentences of the form x knows that S depend on the
alternative-semantic value of S. This difference results in distinct predictions when
we consider the following case. Suppose that there are sentences S and S′ whose
ordinary- or situation-semantic value and the alternative-semantic value look like
the following:
(8) a. [[S]] = [[S′]]
b. [[S]]Alt = {p,q}, [[S′]]Alt = {r}
Furthermore, suppose that John’s belief state and the fact in the actual world w are
as follows:
(9) p q r
John’s belief on E Yes No Yes
Fact in w No Yes Yes
Given these assumptions, we see that the alternative-based analysis predicts
that the truth values of x knows S and x knows S′ in w differ, whereas the situation-
semantic analysis predicts that they don’t. More specifically, the two analyses yield
the following two predictions.
(10) Alternative-based analysis
[[John knows S]]w,E = 0; [[John knows S′]]w,E = 1
(11) Situation-semantic analysis
[[John knows S]]w = [[John knows S′]]w
The first half of (10) derives from the fact that neither p nor q satisfies the
condition that it is one of John’s strongest true beliefs, whose existence is necessary
for the sentence to be true according to the alternative-based analysis. By contrast,
the second half of (10) is due to the fact that the proposition r is John’s strongest
true belief in the alternatives for S′, which is the singleton set of r. On the other
hand, as stated in (11), the situation-semantic analysis does not predict this kind
of discrepancy in truth values between John knows that S and John knows that
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S′. The analysis does not make reference to the alternative-semantic value of the
complement, and since the situation-semantic values of S and S′ are equivalent by
assumption, there should be no difference in meaning between John knows that S
and John knows that S′.
What then would be the concrete examples of S and S′ in the above case? It
depends on the assumptions about alternative-semantic values. Here, following
the literature in alternative semantics and inquisitive semantics (e.g., Kratzer &
Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009), we adopt
the following assumptions:
(12) • A disjunction introduces alternatives corresponding to the ordinary
semantic value of its disjuncts:
[[S1 or S2]]Alt = [[S1]]Alt ∪ [[S2]]Alt ∪{[[S1]], [[S2]], [[S1 or S2]]}
• An indefinite introduces alternatives corresponding to the individuals in
the extension of the NP it combines with:
[[a NP]]wAlt = {λP.P(x) |x ∈ [[NP]]w}∪{[[a NP]]w}
Given these assumptions about alternatives, we see that the following sentences
in (13) can be the concrete examples of S and S′ considered in the above discussion.
(13) S: Mary has a son or a daughter.
S′: Mary has a child.
The two sentences (13S) and (13S′) are equivalent in the ordinary semantic dimen-
sion, but have different alternative semantic values as shown below.5
(14) a. [[S]] = [[S′]] = pc
b. [[S]]Alt = {p |∃x[x∈ [[son or daughter]]w∧ p= λw.Mary has x]}∪{ps, pd, pc}
c. [[S′]]Alt = {p |∃x[x ∈ [[child]]w∧ p = λw.Mary has x]}∪{pc}
• ps = λw.Mary has a son in w
• pd = λw.Mary has a daughter in w
• pc = λw.Mary has a son or a daughter in w= λw.Mary has a child in w
5 A similar kind of contrast between disjunctive and non-disjunctive sentences is predicted in the
‘structural alternatives’ view proposed by Katzir 2007 and Fox & Katzir 2011 if we modify the theory
so that alternatives derived by contraction have priority over those derived by replacement of some
sub-constituent. In this version of the structural alternatives theory, ‘Mary has a son’ is in the set of
‘privileged’ alternatives for the disjunction ‘Mary has a son or a daughter’ since it can be derived by
contraction. On the other hand, the same alternative can be derived from ‘Mary has a child’ only by
replacing the NP, and thus it cannot serve as an alternative for ‘Mary has a child’ in the same status
as it is for ‘Mary has a son or a daughter’.
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Consider a scenario where John believes ps, but does not have a belief about
pd nor any p of the form ‘Mary has specific child x’, and where Mary in fact has a
daughter, but no son. Given this scenario, the alternative semantic analysis predicts
John knows S to be false, but John knows S′ to be true (for the same reasons as in
the above abstract examples). In [[S]]Alt , we cannot find a true proposition which is
one of John’s strongest beliefs. The proposition pc is indeed true and believed by
John, but ps is stronger than pc. On the other hand, in [[S′]]Alt , pc is both true and the
strongest proposition believed by John. We tested this prediction using similar kinds
of examples in a series of experiments, to which we now turn.
3 Experiment 1
3.1 Participants
101 self-identified native speakers of English (49 female, aged 21-67, mean = 32
yrs, standard deviation = 11 yrs), all located in the United States, were recruited
using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Education levels ranged from some High School
to Graduate Study; 75% selected either ‘Bachelors degree’ or ‘Graduate degree’.
Participants were compensated for their time. To screen out repeat participants, we
asked people to take this experiment only once, and informed them that they would
not be paid for retakes. Submitted data from participants with identical Worker IDs
and/or IP addresses were systematically excluded.
3.2 Materials and Methods
Participants were presented with short scenarios, as exemplified in (15). Each
scenario ended with a statement of facts that turns it into either a Gettier-Like (15a)
or a Non-Gettier (15b) scenario (see Appendix).
(15) Example story: John is the coach of a little league baseball team. Today,
John heard from Mary, one of his neighbors, that she wants her child to be
on his team. John did not know that Mary had a child until then, but he is
sure that her child is a boy since all of the kids on his team are boys, and girls
rarely join a baseball team. He is not certain if Mary also has a daughter or
not.
a. In fact, Mary has a daughter, but no son. (Gettier-Like)
b. In fact, Mary has a son, but no daughter. (Non-Gettier)
After reading each scenario, participants were asked to provide absolute truth-
value judgments (i.e., ‘True’ or ‘False’) for two comprehension sentences and one
target sentence. Comprehension sentences were unambiguous true or false sentences
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designed to ensure that participants were attending to the relevant aspects of each
scenario and in particular to the main characters’ beliefs, as exemplified in (16).
(16) Comprehension sentences
a. John is sure that Mary’s child is a boy.
b. John is sure that Mary has a daughter.
Target sentences were knowledge sentences whose embedded complements
involved either a disjunctive (17a) or a non-disjunctive (17b) clause.
(17) Target know-sentences
a. John knows that Mary has a son or a daughter. (Disjunctive)
b. John knows that Mary has a child. (Non-disjunctive)
Four experimental conditions were obtained by crossing the two types of scenar-
ios (Gettier-Like/Non-Gettier) with the two types of know-sentences (Disjunctive/Non-
disjunctive). Four lists of test items were created using a Latin-Square design, so
that each condition was instantiated by one item in each list.
In addition to test items, participants were presented with filler items. These
items were included to disguise the purpose of the experiment, as well as to balance
the number of expected ‘True’ and ‘False’ responses in the whole study. Filler items
involved scenarios in the same spirit as those used in test items, but were followed
only by comprehension sentences. Filler items were not considered for analysis.
3.3 Predictions
The predictions made by the Situation-semantic and the Alternative-sensitive views
are given in Table 1. According to both views, Non-disjunctive sentences of (17b)
are true in Non-Gettier and Gettier-like scenarios. This is so because the present
Gettier-like scenarios were constructed so that the attitude-holder possesses a piece
of evidence for believing the disjunctive proposition independently of her belief in
a specific disjunct, unlike standard Gettier cases such as (1). However, both views
differ regarding what responses to Disjunctive sentences of (17a) are acceptable in
Gettier-Like scenarios.
The Situation-semantic view predicts Disjunctive sentences to be true under
Gettier-Like scenarios, just as Non-disjunctive sentences. This is because, by as-
sumption, the Situation-semantic analysis of know is only sensitive to the truth-
conditional component of the complement, and the truth-conditions of the com-
plements of Non-disjunctive and Disjunctive sentences (e.g., (17a) and (17b), re-
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Condition Gettier-Like Disjunction Predicted response
Sit-semantic Alt-based
(a) No No True True
(b) Yes No True True
(c) No Yes True True
(d) Yes Yes True True/False
Table 1 Summary of the predictions made by the Situation-semantic (Sit-
semantic) and the Alternative-sensitive (Alt-based) views as a function
of experimental condition.
spectively) are equivalent. Thus, according to this analysis, participants’ responses
should not substantially differ across the four conditions.6
On the other hand, following the Alternative-sensitive view, Disjunctive sen-
tences are predicted to be ambiguous under Gettier-Like scenarios: their truth-value
depends on which piece of evidence is chosen as E in (3). For example, in the
Gettier-Like scenario (15a), the sentence (17a) is false if E is the total piece of
evidence available in the scenario (i.e., both E1 and E2 in (18) combined), but true
if E is just the piece of evidence corresponding to Mary’s mentioning of her child
(i.e., only E1). By contrast, Non-disjunctive sentences such as (17b) are predicted
to be unambiguously true in Gettier-Like scenarios since their complements do not
contain any relevant alternative-inducing expression. Thus, the Alternative-sensitive
view predicts the rate of ‘True’ responses to be lower in the Condition (d) than in
the other three conditions.
(18) E1: Mary told John about her child.
E2: Girls rarely join a baseball team.
3.4 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned one of the four lists of items. For each item,
participants were asked to read the scenario carefully, and then to tell us whether the
following sentences were either true or false under this scenario by clicking on one
of two boxes labeled ‘True’ and ‘False’ respectively. Before testing, participants had
6 Nonetheless, we might expect participants to exhibit a greater difficulty in understanding Disjunctive
than Non-disjunctive sentences. This is because disjunctive sentences are more complex regarding
their grammatical structures as well as their felicity conditions. However, we notice that such an
effect of the disjunction should not impact responses to Disjunctive sentences differently across
scenarios. Hence, any reliable decrease in the rate of ‘True’ responses between Condition (c) and (d)
would be inconsistent with the predictions made by the Situation-semantic view.
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Figure 1 Mean (in %) of ‘True’ responses to target know-sentences as a function
of Condition. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals estimated from
binomial distributions.
to read a consent statement and fill out a demographic questionnaire.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Comprehension sentences
Responses to comprehension sentences were aggregated to calculate participants’
global accuracy (i.e., ‘raw score’ for expected true sentences, and ‘100 - raw score’
for expected false sentences). Participants’ performance was accurate (M = 93%,
CI95% [91.5, 95.5]) with no difference between true and false comprehension sen-
tences (t(100) = .79, p = .42). These results ensure that participants did not en-
counter problems in understanding the scenarios in general, and more particularly in
identifying the main characters’ beliefs.
Data from 2 participants whose performance in comprehension sentences were
not different from chance (accuracy < 62%) were excluded from subsequent analyses
(about 2% of the responses). We noticed, however, that including these participants




Results to target sentences are depicted in Figure 1. Data were fitted into a mixed-
effects linear regression model (binomial family) predicting responses from Scenario
(Gettier-Like vs. Non-Gettier) and Sentence (Disjunctive vs. Non-disjunctive). The
model included Subject and Item as random effects, and random slopes for the
interaction of Scenario and Sentence grouped by Item. There was a main effect
of Scenario, a main effect of Sentence and a significant interaction between these
two factors (Scenario: β =−0.82, z =−2.89, p < .005, Sentence: β =−1.7, z =
−6, p < .0001, Scenario×Sentence: β = −1.19, z = −2.1, p < .05). Post-hoc
analyses of the interaction between Scenario and Sentence were performed using
multiple comparisons of means for general linear hypotheses (Tukey contrasts).
They revealed that the interaction was driven by responses to Disjunctive sentences
in Gettier-like scenarios: the rate of ‘True’ responses was significantly lower in
Condition (d) (M = 52%, CI95% [42, 62]) than in the other three conditions (all
Ms > 76%; all β s < −0.32, zs < −5.81, adjusted ps < .001). None of the other
comparisons reached significance.
3.5.3 Discussion
The present results make two contributions. First, the present results show that
Disjunctive know-sentences were in general less frequently accepted than their Non-
disjunctive counterparts regardless of the type of Scenarios they were paired with.
This overall effect of Sentence can be partly accounted for in terms of the felicity
conditions of the disjunction itself. In particular, the difference in the ratings of
‘True’ responses between the (Non-Gettier) Condition (a) and (c) can be explained
by the fact that sentences of the form x knows that p or q are infelicitous since
a shorter alternative of the form s knows that p is true. Second, factoring out
the effect of the disjunction, our original contribution is to show that Disjunctive
know-sentences are less frequently judged as true than equivalent Non-disjunctive
sentences under Gettier-Like scenarios. This pattern of results is fully explained if
we assume that Disjunctive know-sentences are ambiguous in Gettier-Like scenarios
(i.e., depending on the piece of evidence), unlike Non-disjunctive know-sentences,
and that the acceptability of both response types is responsible for the intermediate
rating of ‘True’ responses we observed in Condition (d).
While these findings provide support a priori to the Alternative-sensitive view,
they could receive an alternative interpretation compatible with the Situation-
semantic view. Specifically, the present results could be interpreted as reflecting an
ambiguity between a wide-scope reading and a narrow-scope reading of the disjunc-
tion operator that would be false and true respectively under Gettier-like scenarios.
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In order to test this alternative explanation, we carried out a second experiment.
4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 is a follow-up study to Experiment 1. Focusing on the interpretation
of disjunctive sentences, it aimed at determining whether the pattern of results
previously observed in Gettier-Like scenarios has to be attributed to an extra ‘false’
reading with know taking scope over the disjunction, as predicted by the Alternative-
sensitive view, or rather to a scope ambiguity of the disjunction operator itself.
4.1 Participants
60 new participants (33 female, aged 19-62, mean = 32 yrs, standard deviation = 10
yrs) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Demographics were similar to
Experiment 1. Repeat participants were screened out in the same fashion.
4.2 Experimental design
The experimental method used in Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1.
Scenarios and comprehension sentences were the same as previously described
(cf. (15) and (16)). New target sentences were constructed as follows. First, the
disjunctive know-sentences used in Experiment 1 (cf. (17a)) were modified in order
to rule out potential wide-scope disjunction readings, as shown in (19). Again, these
sentences were presented with Non-Gettier and Gettier-Like scenarios, giving rise to
the Condition (c’) and (d’) respectively.
(19) John knows the following: Mary has a son or a daughter.
a. John knows that Mary has a son or a daughter. (Narrow-scope)
b. John knows that Mary has a son or John knows that Mary has a daughter.
(Wide-scope)
Second, parallel believe-sentences, e.g. (20), were added to control for the
impossibility of wide-scope disjunction readings in this new linguistic environment.
These sentences were constructed so that they were false under a narrow-scope
reading of the disjunction when presented with Gettier-Like scenarios (but otherwise
true). We will refer to these additional control cases as the Condition Believe.
(20) John does not believe the following: Mary has a son or a daughter.
a. John does not believe that Mary has a son or a daughter. (Narrow-scope)
b. John does not believe that Mary has a son or John does not believe that
Mary has a daughter. (Wide-scope)
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The predictions made by the Situation-semantic and the Alternative-sensitive
views are summarized in Table 2. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1
(see 3.4).
Condition Gettier-Like Disjunction Predicted response
Sit-semantic Alt-based
(c’) No Yes True True
(d’) Yes Yes True True/False
Believe Yes Yes False False
Table 2 Summary of the predictions made by the Situation-semantic (Sit-




Responses to comprehension sentences were treated as in Experiment 1. Participants’
global accuracy was very high (M = 92%, CI95% [89, 94.5]) with no difference
between true and false comprehension sentences. In subsequent analyses, data were
excluded from 2 participants whose performance were not different from chance
(accuracy < 62%). Including these participants yielded no significant differences in
the pattern of results.
4.3.2 Target sentences
Results to target sentences are depicted in Figure 1. Comparisons of responses
between the three conditions were carried out using mixed-effects linear regression
models (binomial family). Each model included Condition as a fixed-effect and
random effects for Subject and Item, with a random slope for Condition by Item.
As expected, the highest rate of ‘True’ responses was observed in the (c’)-
condition (M = 89%, CI95% [78, 95]), and the lowest rate in the Believe-condition
(M = 17%, CI95% [9, 29]).7 The mean rating of ‘True’ responses in the (d’)-condition
(M = 58%, CI95% [45, 70]) fell between the rating obtained in the (c’)-condition
and in the Believe-condition: β = 1.81, z = 3.57, p < .0005 and β =−1.91, z =
−4.3, p < .0001, respectively.
7 No difference in participants’ accuracy to these two conditions (i.e., ‘True’ responses in the (c’)-
condition and ‘False’ responses in the Believe-condition) was found (β = .59, z = 1.06, p = .28).
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Figure 2 Mean (in %) of ‘True’ responses to target sentences as a function of
Condition. All differences between successive bars are significant. Error
bars are 95% confidence intervals estimated from binomial distributions.
4.4 Discussion
These findings replicate the main results from Experiment 1. The rating of ‘True’
responses in the (d’)-condition was found to be similar to that observed for the
(d)-condition in Experiment 1, and to fall between the ratings obtained for parallel
but unambiguous true and false sentences. Hence, the present results confirm that
participants’ linguistic judgments of disjunctive knowledge sentences in Gettier-Like
scenarios cannot be attributed to a scope ambiguity of the disjunction.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed the difference in predictions between Uegaki’s (2012)
alternative-based analysis and non-alternative-based analyses, in particular, Kratzer’s
(2002) situation-semantic analysis of the verb know. These predictions were empiri-
cally tested in two experiments using a truth-value judgment paradigm. According
to the present results, knowledge sentences with a disjunctive complement are less
likely to be judged as true than equivalent sentences without disjunction under
Gettier-like scenarios. These findings provide evidence for the alternative-based




Nonetheless, open questions remain regarding the generality of these findings.
Here, we would like to point out two of them. The first one concerns the precise
characterization of alternative-inducing expressions. In this paper, we have focused
on a rather simple contrast between disjunctive and non-disjunctive sentences in
their alternative-semantic values. However, it remains to be seen whether the current
results can be replicated with other alternative-inducing expressions, such as indefi-
nites, when they are paired with suitable classically equivalent examples without an
alternative-inducing expression.
The second question is whether the results can be replicated with simpler scenar-
ios that involve just one piece of ‘evidence’. The experiments presented in this paper
involve scenarios with two independent pieces of evidence, one of which justifies
a true proposition while the two pieces taken together lead to a false proposition.
On the other hand, in the standard Gettier cases, the agent only has one piece of
evidence leading him to believe a false proposition, from which he infers a true
proposition. Testing whether the result can be replicated using this kind of simpler
scenarios will be our next step.
That said, the findings reported in this paper uncover a previously untested aspect
of the semantics of knowledge-attribution sentences, i.e., its alternative-sensitivity.
On the theoretical side, this result could be connected to Contrastivism (Schaffer
2007) in the epistemological literature, which tries to understand knowledge in terms
of the role of contrasts between alternative possibilities. On the empirical side,
this result further enriches the growing literature on the empirical investigation of
people’s judgment of knowledge attribution (e.g., Weinberg, Nichols & Stich 2001;
Starmans & Friedman 2012).
A Stories used in Experiment 1 and 2
(21) Story 1. Simon is flying to Europe with his colleague, Mike. Simon’s seat
is right behind Mike’s seat. When the flight attendant came to serve food,
he told them that the choices for the dish were either beef or pasta. Simon
couldn’t hear what Mike ordered, but he is sure that Mike ordered beef
because he knows that Mike likes beef a lot. Also, he thinks he can smell
beef coming from the row in front of him.
(22) Story 2. John is the coach of a little league baseball team. Today, John heard
from Mary, one of his neighbors, that she wants her child to be on his team.
John didn’t know that Mary had a child until then, but he is sure that her
child is a boy since all of the kids on his team are boys, and girls rarely join a
baseball team. He is not certain if Mary also has a daughter or not.
(23) Story 3. George is meeting Lisa at a restaurant. When she enters the
restaurant, he notices that she has a pass in her hand that can be used either
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for riding the bus or the subway. This indicates that she has used public
transportation to come to the restaurant. George is sure that she used the
subway because he knows that the subway is more convenient than the bus
for her to travel from her house to the restaurant (and the town has no public
transportation other than the bus and the subway).
(24) Story 4. Kim knows a lot about computers. Today, one of her friends, Sam,
asked her to look at his computer because his computer was suddenly very
slow. Kim has seen him using a laptop computer. So, she is certain that Sam
owns a laptop computer, and that this computer is the one that he wants her to
look at. She is not certain whether he also has a desktop computer in addition
to the laptop computer.
References
Alonso-Ovalle, Luis. 2006. Disjunction in Alternative Semantics: University of
Massachusetts at Amherst Ph.D. dissertation.
AnderBois, Scott. 2011. Issues and alternatives: University of California, Santa
Cruz Ph.D. dissertation.
Clark, Michael. 1963. Knowledge and grounds: A comment on Mr. Gettier’s paper.
Analysis 24. 46–48.
DeRose, Keith. 1992. Contextualism and knowledge attributions. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 52(4). 913–929.
Dretske, Fred. 1972. Contrastive statements. The Philosophical Review 81. 411–437.
Fox, Danny & Roni Katzir. 2011. On the characterization of alternatives. Natural
Language Semantics 19. 87–107.
Gettier, Edmund. 1963. Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23(6). 121–123.
Goldman, Alvin. 1976. Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of
Philosophy 73(20). 771–791.
Groenendijk, Jeroen & Floris Roelofsen. 2009. Inquisitive semantics and pragmatics.
In J. M. Larrazabal & L. Zubeldia (eds.), Meaning, Content, and Argument:
ILCLI International Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric, .
Hamblin, Charles L. 1973. Questions in Montague English. Foundations of Language
10(1). 41–53.
Katzir, Roni. 2007. Structurally-defined alternatives. Linguistics and Philosophy
30(6). 669–690. doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9029-y.
Kratzer, Angelika. 2002. Facts: Particulars or information units? Linguistics and
Philosophy 25(5–6). 655–670.
Kratzer, Angelika & Junko Shimoyama. 2002. Indeterminate pronouns: The view
from Japanese. In Yukio Otsu (ed.), Third Tokyo Conference on Psycholinguis-
tics, 1–25. Tokyo: Hituji Shobo.
79
Uegaki & Marty
Lycan, William G. 2006. On the Gettier problem problem. In Stephen Hetherington
(ed.), Epistemology Futures, 148–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rooth, Mats. 1985. Association with Focus: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Ph.D. dissertation.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007. Knowing the answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 75(2). 383–403.
Starmans, Christina & Ori Friedman. 2012. The folk conception of knowledge.
Cognition 124(3). 272–283.
Uegaki, Wataru. 2012. Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem.
In Maria Aloni, Floris Roelofsen, Katrin Schulz, Galit Weidmann-Sassoon &
Matthijs Westera (eds.), Logic, Language and Meaning: Selected Papers from
the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium, 52–61. Springer.
Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich. 2001. Normativity and
epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29(1–2). 429–460.
Wataru Uegaki
MIT Linguistics and Philosophy





MIT Linguistics and Philosophy
77 Massachusetts Avenue, 32-D808
Cambridge, MA 02139
USA
pmarty@mit.edu
80
